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THE RHETORIC OF RIGHTS:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
CHARTER*
By MARC GOLD**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada's initial interpretations of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were as broad and liberal
as could possibly have been expected. Invoking the metaphor of the
constitution as a living tree and dismissing concerns about the
legitimacy of its expanded role, the Court upheld the Charter
arguments in the majority of the cases it decided during this first
period.2 Even in those cases where the claim was denied, the Court
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C.RID.P. in November 1986, and will appear under the title "La rhetorique des droits
constitutionnels" (1988) 22 Themis (forthcoming).
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Ac 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11, ss.1-34 (hereinafter the Charter).
2 The following cases are considered in -this paper. The Law Society of Upper Canada v.
Skapinker (1984), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, 11 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (hereinafter Skapinker); A.G. Quebec
v. Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards (1984), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66, 10 D.L.R. (4th) 321;
Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 11 D.L.Rt (4th) 641 (hereinafter Hunter v.
Southam); Re Singh and Minister of Employment and Immigration (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177,
58 N.R. 1 (hereinafter Singh); 1. v. Big MDrug Mart Ltd. (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295,18 D.L1R
(4th) 321 (hereinafter Big MDntgMart); Staranchuk v. R (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.RL 439,22 D.LI.
(4th) 480; Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R. (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481
(hereinafter Operation Dismantle); R. v. Therens (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.RI 613,18 D.L.RI (4th) 655;
Trask v. R. (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.RI 655, 19 D.L.R (4th) 123; Rahn v. R. (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.R.
659, 19 D.L.R (4th) 126; Krig v. R. (1985), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 255, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 161; Spencer
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made it clear that the Charter was to be taken very seriously? No
one could mistake the Court's message: the Charter was to be
liberally interpreted and enthusiastically applied.
This paper examines the rhetoric used by the Supreme Court
of Canada in its first applications of the Charter. Part I reviews the
basic principles of the rhetorical analysis of law and sets out the
context within which the rhetoric of the Court must be situated.
Part II examines various ways in which the Court attempts to
legitimate the broad role it has assumed under the Charter, while
Part III analyses the rhetoric of the Court used to justify particular
case results. I conclude with some brief observations on the judicial
activism of the Court as manifested in these early cases, and I
comment on the direction that future work on Charter rhetoric
should take.
II. THE RHETORICAL CONTEXT
A. Rhetorical Analysis of Law
The study of rhetoric currently enjoys a Renaissance in a
variety of disciplines.4 No longer pejoratively considered to be
v. R. (1985), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 756; Dubois v. R. (1985), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350,
23 D.L.R1 (4th) 503; Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.) (1985), [1985] 2
S.C.R. 486, 24 D.L.R (4th) 536; Valente v. R (1985), [1985] 2 S.C.RI 673, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 161;
and R. v. Oakes (1986), [1986] 1 S.C.Rt 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 (hereinafter Oakes).
3 For example, although denying the Charter claim in Skapinker, the opinion of Mr. Justice
Estey is replete with references to the need to interpret the Charter broadly. Supra, note 2,
365-67. Similarly, in Operation Dismantle, the Court affirmed the application of the Charter to
exercises of the royal prerogative, and dismissed as inappropriate the limiting doctrines of non-
justiciability and "political questions," all in the context of rejecting the Charter argument on
its merits. See infra, Part II(A).
4 In philosophy, a rhetorical perspective underlies the work of Richard Rorty. See, for
example, R Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1979); R Rorty, "Epistemological Behaviourism and the De-Transcendentalization of Analytic
Philosophy" in R. Hollinger ed., Hermeneutics and P rads (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame
University Press, 1985) 89. Indeed, it has been observed that modern hermeneutics is
predicated upon the theoretical tools of rhetoric. See Hans Georg Gadamer, "On the Scope
and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection" in H.G. Gadamer, ed., Philosophical Henneneutics,
trans. D.E. Linge (Berkeley. University of California Press, 1976) 18 at 24. Recently, rhetorical
[vOL 25 No. 2
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ornamental and usually misleading speech, rhetoric is now
understood to be an indispensible and inescapable tool of practical
reason in all domains of human activity. Indeed, there is a growing
literature on law and rhetoric that offers the interested reader a
number of useful case studies and introductions to rhetorical analysis
as applied to law.5 This obviates the need for more than a few
words of introduction to this way of looking at the law.
There are two related foci of rhetorical analysis. The first is
based upon the Aristotelian definition of rhetoric as the faculty of
discovering the available means of persuasion in a given case.
6
Rhetorical analysis thus conceived involves the analysis of the means
used to persuade the audience that the result in a given case or set
of cases was justified. The second dimension to rhetorical analysis
is based upon a conception of rhetoric as the way in which we
constitute ourselves as a community through language.7 Understood
analysis has been applied to modem economic theory: see Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric
of Economics (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). For an examination of the
role of rhetoric in the natural sciences, see Stephen Toulmin, "The Construal of Reality:.
Criticism in Modern and Postmodem Science", in W.J. Thomas Mitchell, ed., The Politics of
hIterpretation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) 99. See also S. Toulmin, The Uses
of Argunent (Cambridge, Eng.: University Press, 1958).
5 For a variety of perspectives on the relationship of rhetoric to law, see Chaim Perelman,
Logiquejuridique 2d ed., (Bruxelles: Etablissements Emile Bruylant, Societe anonyme d'editions
juridiques et scientifiques, 1979); J. White, Heracles Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of
the Law (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); M. Ball, Lying Down Together:
Law, Metaphor, and Theology (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); P.
Goodrich, Reading the Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). For case studies of judicial
rhetoric, see L. LaRue, "The Rhetoric of Powell's Bakke," [1981] Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 43;
Erwin Chemerinsky, "Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and the Abortion
Controversy" (1982) 31 Buffalo L Rev. 107; Robert A. Prentice, "Supreme Court Rhetoric"
(1983) 25 Ariz. L. Rev. 85; M. Gold, "The Mask of Objectivity: Politics and Rhetoric in the
Supreme Court of Canada" (1985) 7 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 455.
6 Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. W. Rhys Roberts (New York: Modem Library, 1954) at 1355.
On rhetoric generally, see C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, 77w New Rhetoric: Treatise on
Argttentation (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1958); Kenneth Burke, A
Rhetoric of Motives (New York: Braziller, 1955); Maurice Nathanson and Henry W. Johnstone,
Jr., eds., Philosophy, Rhetoric andArgumentation (University Park: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1965); Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black, eds., The Prospect of Rhetoric (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971); Thomas R. Nilsen, ed., Essays on Rhetorical Criticism (New York:
Random House, 1968); and E. Black, Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method (New York:
Macmillan, 1965).
7 See White, supra, note 5. This conception of rhetoric can be seen as a subset or
outgrowth of the more traditional conception outlined above. See Gold, supra, note 5 at 459-
460.
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in this way, a rhetorical analysis of Charter cases would concentrate
on the political visions expressed by these judgments.
This paper pursues both aspects of rhetorical analysis, but
for reasons more practical than theoretical, it concentrates more on
the means of persuasion than on the political visions articulated by
the Court. Because this study examines only a very limited set of
cases, any evaluation of the Court's overall political vision risks being
incomplete and ultimately misleading. For example, although it will
be suggested later that the Court projects a highly individualistic
image of Canadian society in its initial opinions, it would seem
premature to conclude that this image will persist without
qualification as the Court proceeds through its docket. A complete
and balanced analysis of this dimension of the Court's rhetoric must
therefore be based upon a larger set of cases decided over a longer
period of time, and must await another occasion.
To understand the rhetoric of the Court, one must examine
what Lloyd Bitzer has called "the rhetorical situation," that is, the
concrete situation confronting the Court, the audiences to whom the
Court's opinions are directed, and the constraints imposed on the
Court by the expectations of those audiences.8 The following section
addresses the audiences of the Court and the expectations they had
regarding the Charter's interpretation.
B. The Audiences and Their Expectations
The Supreme Court has a variety of audiences to whom its
opinions may be directed: the parties to the case, Parliament,
legislatures and other governmental institutions, the bench, the bar,
the academic community, the public, and the media.9 When the
Court first embarked upon its interpretations of the Charter, it is
striking that there appeared to be a consensus amongst the various
audiences that the Charter ought to be interpreted in a liberal and
activist fashion. At the same time, there was an expectation that the
Court would decide the cases in a judicial, and not political manner.
8 L. Bitzer, 'he Rhetorical Situation" (1968) 1 Philosophy & Rhetoric 1.
9 On the audiences of the Court, see Gold, supra, note 5 at 460-61.
378 [VOL 25 No. 2
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These two expectations significantly influenced the rhetoric of the
Court.
There can be little doubt that a large number of groups both
wanted and expected the Court to give a large and liberal
interpretation to the Charter. The public favoured the
entrenchment of the Charter, influenced in this respect by the large-
scale advertising programme initiated by the federal government to
promote its virtues. Presented as a way in which the citizen would
be protected from the abuses of government, the idea of the Charter
was popular amongst Canadians.
At the same time, there was no substantial or sustained
debate on the merits of entrenching the Charter and the increase
in judicial power that would accompany it. At the political level, the
three federal parties supported the idea of entrenchment
notwithstanding the opposition of the Conservatives and some New
Democrats to the unilateralism of the process. At the provincial
level, it was the process that dominated the debate e° A number of
provincial premiers, notably Premiers Lyon of Manitoba and
Blakeney of Saskatchewan, expressed their opposition to the idea of
an entrenched Charter, but they proved unable to influence the
debate significantly. By ridiculing them as politicians representing
narrow and parochial interests, who were prepared to trade
individual rights for fish, Prime Minister Trudeau and his colleagues
succeeded in delegitimating their principled arguments against the
Charter. As a result, the public bought the idea of entrenchment
without worrying very much about the question of the enhanced
powers of the courts.
As for the expectations of the academic community, most
commentators desired to see the Court play an activist role in
interpreting the Charter.11 In this regard, it is impossible to
10 On the history preceding patriation, see D. Milne, The New Canadian Constitution
(Toronto: Lorimer, 1982); K. Banting and R. Simeon, eds., And No One Cheered: Federalism,
Democracy and the ConstitutionalAct (Toronto: Methuen, 1983); R. Sheppard and M. Valpy,
The National Deal: The Fight for a Canadian Constitution (Toronto: Fleet Books, 1982); and
E. McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution 1979-1982- Patriation and the Charter of Rights
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982).
11 It would appear that the Court is increasingly sensitive and responsive to the views of
legal academies. See, for example, Hon. Mr. Brian Dickson, "The Public Responsibility of
Lawyers" (1983) 13 Man. LJ. 175 at 179-80.
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overstate the influence of the Canadian Bill of Rights12 on both the
Court and the academic community. It was generally agreed that the
Court had failed miserably in its application of the Bill of Rights,
and the main thrust of most commentary was to encourage the
Court to take a more active and liberal role in the protection of
rights. Similarly, most of the academic writing on the Charter
supported a broad role for the Court.13  In any event, most
commentators assumed that the fact of entrenchment, reinforced by
the provisions of sections 24 and 52, would incline the Supreme
Court to take a broader view of the Charter than it had of the Bill
of Rights.14 There was thus an appearance of consensus on how the
Court would and should approach the interpretation of the Charter.
Also worth underlining was the role played by the various
individuals and groups who testified before the Special Joint
Committee of the House of Commons and Senate. Those who
favoured both the idea of entrenchment and an expanded role for
the courts had the largest influence on the final drafting of the
Charter.15  Not only did these "pro-Charter" groups influence the
Charter's final text, they also influenced the general political climate
surrounding it. It was thus possible to believe that the issues
surrounding the Charter had been completely mooted and that a
social consensus had crystallized around the idea of an expanded
role for the courts.
12 R.S.C. 1970, App. III (hereinafter the Bill of Rights).
13 To be sure, there were some dissenting voices, but they were clearly in the minority.
Moreover, some of the most articulate arguments against the Charter were offered by political
scientists and not lawyers. See, for example, Peter H. Russell, "The Effect of a Charter of
Rights on the Policy-Making Role of Canadian Courts" (1985) 25 Can. Pub. Admin. 1; D.
Smiley, "A Dangerous Deed: The Constitution Act, 1982" in Banting and Simeon, eds., supra,
note 10 at 74. For those who believe that lawyers understand issues of constitutional rights
better than anyone else - and there are a fair number within the legal community - the
criticisms of non-lawyers may have been somewhat easy to ignore.
14 See, for example, W.S. Tarnopolsky and G.A. Beaudoin, eds., The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms: Commentary (Toronto: Carswell, 1982). There were some who argued
that the fact of entrenchment would not, in and of itself, alter the conservative approach of the
Court. See, for example, B. Hovius and R. Martin, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 354. Nevertheless, this
clearly went against the grain of most of the academic writing on the subject.
15 Milne, supra, note 10 at 86-89.
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This appearance of a consensus would not have influenced
the Supreme Court were it not compatible with its own view of itself
as an institution. For some time, however, the Court has seen itself
as an increasingly important actor on the political scene.16
Combined with the expectations of its various audiences, this self-
image rendered the idea of an activist and liberal court in Charter
matters virtually irresistible.
Also important was the particular judicial context in which
the Supreme Court delivered its initial decisions. The Charter had
been interpreted by lower courts for some years before the Supreme
Court released its own first opinion, and radically different positions
had been taken by various courts on virtually every issue that could
arise.17 More specifically, the courts were divided on the question
of the extent to which the entrenchment of the Charter had altered
the basic principles of Canadian constitutional law. Accordingly, one
of the initial tasks of the Supreme Court was to provide guidance to
both bench and bar regarding the basic perspective that should be
taken in Charter argument and interpretation. The Court clearly
believed that the text and history of the Charter required that it be
interpreted generously, and that that message had to be conveyed
clearly and unambiguously to both bench and bar.
Nevertheless, there existed an important constraint on the
ability of the Court to apply the Charter liberally, a constraint
flowing from both the expectations of the Court's audiences and the
self-image of the Court itself. Simply put, it was expected that the
Court would interpret the Charter in a non-political, judicial manner.
Accordingly, it was important for the Court to find ways to interpret
the Charter generously without putting into question the legitimacy
of its role as an adjudicative body. Before considering such matters,
however, it is necessary to say a few words about constitutional
interpretation in order to provide a benchmark against which the
Court's rhetoric may be evaluated.
16 For some examples, see M. Gold, "The Rhetoric of Constitutional Argumentation"
(1985) 35 U. of Toronto LJ. 154, notes 3-6.
17 See F.L Morton and MJ. Withey, Charting the Charter, 1982-1985: A Statistical Analysis
(Calgary: Research Unit for Socio-Legal Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of
Calgary, 1986) and PJ. Monahan, "A Critic's Guide to the Charter" in RJ. Sharpe, ed., Charter
Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) at 383-408.
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C. Constitutional Interpretation
There is a vast literature on the subject of constitutional
interpretation, and I do not intend to summarize it (were that
possible) or offer any prescriptions about how the Charter ought to
be interpreted."i Instead, I wish only to describe what necessarily
takes place when a text like the Charter is being interpreted.
Let me begin rather dogmatically. The meaning of the
Charter is exclusively a function of its interpretation. There is no
sense in which the meaning inheres intrinsically in the words of the
text, in the minds of the drafters, or anywhere else for that matter,
in a manner that is independent from the interpretive process.19
Accordingly, the judges are responsible for the meaning given to the
rights and freedoms set out in the Charter, however much they may
tie their interpretations to the views of others. Moreover, the
meaning to be given to a particular phrase or text will vary with the
interpreter's conception of both the nature of the text and the
purposes to be served by its interpretation.
This general view of the relationship between meaning and
interpretation is consistent with the way in which the Supreme Court
has treated its earlier decisions under the Bill of Rights when
interpreting analogous clauses of the Charter. For example, the
Court has refused to follow the definition of freedom of religion it
had previously adopted under the Bill of Rights, arguing that the
narrow interpretation it gave to the Bill of Rights was a function of
the Court's view of its non-constitutional nature.20 Thus the Court
18 For my views concerning the interpretation of the equality rights guarantees in the
Charter, see M. Gold, "A Principled Approach to Equality Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry"
(1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L.R. 131; M. Gold, "Moral and Political Theories in Equality Rights
Adjudication" in J. Weiler and R. Elliot, eds., Litigating the Values of a Nation: The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) 85. On constitutional interpretation
more generally, see Gold, supra, note 16.
19 See generally H.G. Gadamer, Tuth andMethod, trans. G. Barden and J. Cumming (New
York. Crossroad, 1985). For a useful account of hermeneutical theories, see Richard Palmer,
Hermeneutics (Evanston I1.: Northwestern University Press, 1969).
2 0 Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 2 at 342-344. See also R. v. Therens, supra, note 2 at 638-
382 [voL 25 NO. 2
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recognizes that the meaning of a text is a function of the
relationship between the text and the interpreter, not something that
inheres naturally in the text, and that in the process of interpretation
one is inevitably influenced by one's view of that text's nature and
status.
It is also the case that the materials that judges bring to bear
on their interpretation of the Charter necessarily go beyond strictly
legal considerations. The very act of understanding engages the
personal values, experience, and prejudices of the interpreter.21 We
simply cannot understand anything without relying upon our
accumulated stock of knowledge, much of which is tacit rather than
explicit. It follows that no judge can ever be aware of all of the
forces influencing the interpretations given to the Charter, much less
set them out on paper. In this respect, written reasons for judgment
are necessarily incomplete.
In giving meaning to the Charter the Court works with a
relatively discrete set of argumentative conventions, by which I mean
forms of argument through which the interpretation of the Charter
is effected. As has been discussed elsewhere, one can identify six
basic kinds of arguments in our constitutional jurisprudence: textual,
historical, structural, doctrinal, prudential, and ethical.22 Although
all are legitimate in the sense that they can all claim some plausible
link with certain features of the Charter, no one form of argument
can claim an a priori superiority over the others. What can be said,
however, is that different forms of argument suggest different images
of the Court as constitutional interpreter. For example, arguments
based upon the text of the Charter, its history, or on judicial
precedents tend to suggest an image of interpretation that minimizes,
if not obscures, the creative role of the Court in giving the Charter
meaning. On the other hand, the remaining forms of argument
more clearly implicate the Court's responsibility for the
interpretations rendered.23
21 On the centrality of one's prejudices, see Gadamer, supra, note 19 at 238ff.
22 Gold, supra note 16. This taxonomy was adopted from P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
23 Gold, supra, note 16.
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Just as there are a number of argumentative conventions
available to a Court, so too are there a number of different
functions that a Court performs in reviewing the constitutionality of
legislation. They include the functions of policing the boundaries of
governmental power set out in the constitution, legitimating the
exercise of such power within its limits, "cueing" other institutions of
government, including lower courts, as to how the Charter is to be
understood, and expressing through its opinions its conception of the
basic values underlying Canadian society.24 These functions appear
to flow inevitably from the role assumed by the Supreme Court in
our constitutional system.
None of this is meant to suggest that the interpretation of
the Charter is necessarily subjective or arbitrary, or that the text
exercises no influence on the interpreter. Indeed, to put it in such
terms implies that there is some "objective" way to interpret a text
that could somehow escape the influence of these factors. Such is
not the case.25 What is important is the rhetorical force of appeals
to objectivity in interpretation, because the legitimacy of the judicial
role depends to no small extent on the perception that the judiciary
is applying rules and principles of the law, rather than deciding cases
based on personal political preferences. Thus we can distinguish
between different styles of opinion writing and different images
projected by the Court as an institution.
The more traditional style can be termed formalistic in the
sense that decisions are portrayed as following from the impartial
application of pre-existing rules. The image of the Court implied by
this style is that of a neutral, reactive institution. It engages what
Abram Chayes has called the classical image of adjudication.2 6 The
competing style portrays adjudication not as a matter of applying
rules, but as a matter of balancing competing interests: the Court
appears actively and personally involved in the resolution of the
issues, and does not pretend simply to apply the will of others in
24 On the functions of the Court see Gold, supra, note 16. For a more complete account,
see Bobbitt, supra, note 22.
25 Gold, supra, note 16.
2 6 A. Chayes, "Foreward: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court" (1982) 96 Harv. L.
Rev. 4. For a fuller account, see Gold, supra, note 5.
[yoL. 25 No. 2
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resolving the case. Chayes has termed this the public law image of
adjudication and one could also call it a political image of
adjudication. 27
These admittedly rough distinctions between judicial styles
will prove useful in evaluating the Court's rhetoric. To legitimate
judicial review under the Charter, the Court tended to invoke the
rhetoric of the classical image, thereby avoiding the appearance that
the Court itself was playing a major political role. In this way the
Court responded to the central expectations of its audiences: that
it interpret the Charter generously without moving from the judicial
arena to the political.
III. THE RHETORIC OF LEGITIMACY
A. Establishing the Legitimacy of Judicial Review
As important as it was for the Court to set out the basic
principles of Charter interpretation in the early cases, it was equally
important for the Court to establish the legitimacy of the broad
interpretive role it had chosen for itself. To this end, the Court
invoked a series of arguments based upon the text and history of the
Charter, the main thrust of which were to show that the Court had
no choice but to assume the role imposed upon it.
The Court's reliance upon the provisions of section 24 of the
Charter and section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 to justify
judicial review under the Charter was predictable and appropriate.
Entrenchment of the Charter, reflected in section 52, was the
principal reason cited by the academic commentators in defence of
a broad role for the courts, and section 24 makes it clear that the
courts possess a broad remedial authority with regard to Charter
breaches. Nevertheless, it is illuminating that the Court chose to
rely upon textual arguments to support its new role. By so doing,
27 Chayes, ibid.
1987]
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the Court appears to have exercised no choice in the matter, and to
have acted simply as the constitutional text dictated.
In this respect, consider how the Court used these textual
arguments to reject any limitations to the exercise of its mandate for
judicial review. For example, in Operation Dismantle, counsel for the
federal government argued that the issues raised were inherently
non-justiciable and were outside the ambit of judicial review by
virtue of their political nature. Madame Justice Wilson relied upon
section 24 of the Charter not only to reject these arguments, but to
reject as inappropriate the notion that doctrines of non-justiciability
and "political questions" ought to be part of the jurisprudence of the
Charter. Characterizing the issue as whether or not the
government's defence policy violates section 7 of the Charter, she
wrote:
I do not think there can be any doubt that this is a question for the courts. Indeed,
s.24(1) of the Charter...makes it clear that the adjudication of that question is the
responsibility of "a court of competent jurisdiction". While the court is entitled to
grant such remedy as it "considers appropriate and just in the circumstances", I do
not think it is open to it to relinquish its jurisdiction either on the basis that th ssue
is inherently non-justiciable or that it raises a so-called "political question"....5k
By invoking the text of the Charter, Madame Justice Wilson secured
a large role for the courts without appearing in any way responsible
for the assumption of that role. It was the Charter itself, we are
told, that obliged the Court to respond to the questions posed in the
case.
29
Historical arguments also figured prominently in the early
cases. Foi' example, in Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor
Vehicle Act (B. c.), Mr. Justice Lamer justified a broad interpretation
of section 7 by drawing a parallel between judicial review under the
Charter and judicial review of the division of legislative powers in
the Constitution: "[i]t is the scope of constitutional adjudication
which has been altered rather than its nature, at least, as regards the
right to consider the content of legislation."30  By establishing a
28 Operation Dismantle, supra, note 2 at 472.
29 "It is therefore, in my view, not only appropriate that we decide the matter, it is our
constitutional obligation to do so." Ibid., 473-474.
30 Supra, note 2 at 496.
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continuity between its role before and after entrenchment, the Court
attempted to legitimate judicial review under the Charter by
minimizing its novelty.
In any event, the Court tells us, it had no choice but to
assume the role thrust upon it. As Mr. Justice Lamer wrote:
It ought not to be forgotten that the historic decision to entrench the Charter in our
Constitution was taken not by the courts but by the elected representatives of the
people of Canada. It was those representatives who extended the scope of
constitutional adjudication and entrusted the courts with this new and onerous
responsibility. Adjudication underlpe Charter must be approached free of any
lingering doubts as to its legitimacy.
It is true, of course, that the "historic decision" was taken by
elected officials and not by the Court. At the same time, one
should not forget the important role played by the Court in the
patriation process, a role that legitimated the entrenchment of the
Charter itselfE2 Just as textual argument can obscure the Court's
responsibility for the result reached, this historical argument avoids
reference to the Court's pre-entrenchment role.
The rhetorical significance of all these arguments is two-fold.
First, the Court uses those forms of argument that place the
responsibility for the Court's expanded role on others, and portrays
itself as merely responding to the will of others. Although this
positivist image contrasts sharply with what the Court actually has
done in the exercise of judicial review, it does function to legitimate
the Court's role in the eyes of its audiences, notably those in the
legal community.
Second, the Court's concern with removing any doubts about
the legitimacy of its role is telling. This goal was pursued in a
number of additional ways. One recurring technique was to invoke
a distinction between proper and improper approaches to
constitutional interpretation in order to reassure its audiences that
the Court was following the proper and legitimate approach. This
is the subject of the following section.
31 Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), supra, note 2 at 497.
32 See Reference Re Amendment to the Constitution of Canada (Nos. 1, 2 and 3) (1981),
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, [1981] 1 W.W.R. 1; Re A.G. Quebec and A.G. Canada (1982), [1982] 2
S.C.R. 793, 140 D.L.R. (3d) 385.
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B. "Courts Do Not Question the Wisdom of Legislation."33
In virtually all of its decisions, the Court insisted on the
distinction between assessing the constitutionality and questioning the
wisdom of legislation. Indeed, this is invoked in the first paragraph
of the first case decided by the Court under the Charter.3 4
This distinction cannot be maintained in any strong sense
with regard to Charter interpretation. To the extent that the
distinction implies only that a judge does not decide a case explicitly
on the basis of his or her personal preferences, it is possible to
believe that judges can and do honour it. It seems to me, however,
that the Court invokes this distinction in a stronger and more
controversial sense than this. The core idea appears to be that
there is something intrinsically different about judging the wisdom of
legislation and assessing its constitutionality so that the former role
is entrusted to the political branches of government while the latter
is ultimately a matter for the courts? 5  The maintenance of this
distinction is necessary in order to legitimate the Court's role.
Consider the opinion of Mr. Justice Lamer in Reference Re
Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.c.), where the absolute
33 Amax Potash Ltd. v. Saskatchewan (1976), [1977] 2 S.C.RI 576 at 590, [1976] 6 W.W.R.
61.
34 "At the outset, let it be emphasized in the clearest possible language that the issue
before this Court in this appeal is not whether it is or is not in the interest of this community
to require Canadian citizenship as a precondition to membership in the bar. Rather, the only
issue is whether s. 28(c) of the Law Society Act, supra, is inconsistent with s. 6(2)(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." Skapinker, supra, note 2 at 359-360.
35 Madame Justice Wilson appears to embrace this conception of the distinction when she
states, in Operation Dismantle, supra, note 2 at 472: "[I]f the court were simply being asked to
express its opinion on the wisdom of the executive's exercise of its defence powers in this case,
the court would have to decline. It cannot substitute its opinion for that of the executive to
whom the decision-making power is given by the Constitution." For a similar view of the
impossibility of maintaining the distinction beteen wisdom and constitutionality, see Patrick J.
Monahan and Andrew Petter, "Developments in Constitutional Law- The 1985-86 Term" (1987)
9 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 69.
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liability provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act 36 were held to violate
section 7 of the Charter and were not justified under section 1 as
being necessary to keep bad drivers off the road. Having invoked
the distinction between the constitutionality and wisdom of
legislation at least four times in the course of his reasons for
judgment, Mr. Justice Lamer wrote:
I do not take issue with the fact that it is highly desirable that "bad drivers" be kept
off the road. I do not take issue either with the desirability of punishing severely bad
drivers who are in contempt of prohibitions against driving. The bottom line of the
question to be addressed here is: whether the Government of British Columbia has
demonstrated as justifiable that the risk of imprisonment of a few innocent is, given
the desirability of ridding the roads of British Columbia of bad drivers, a reasonable
limit in a free and democratic society. That result is to be measured against the
offence being one of strict liability open to a defence of due diligence, the succej
of which does nothing more than let those few who did nothing wrong remain free.
One might be tempted to argue that Mr. Justice Lamer was
not questioning the wisdom of the legislation inasmuch as he
accepted the objectives underlying it and only questioned the means
chosen by which to realize them. Nonetheless, by drawing the
comparison between absolute and strict liability, he is saying that it
was unwise to have opted for a regime of absolute liability in this
case. If this is so, wherein lies the distinction between the wisdom
and the constitutionality of legislation?
Simply put, the distinction cannot be maintained in the face
of section 1 of the Charter. According to the Chief Justice in R. v.
Oakes, section 1 addresses both the objectives of legislation and the
means used to achieve those objectives. Regarding the former, the
objective must relate to "concerns which are pressing and substantial
in a free and democratic society before it can be characterized as
sufficiently important. 38  But how can a court decide that an
objective is sufficiently important without putting into question the
wisdom of the legislation itself? It seems obvious that the wisdom
36 RS.B.C. 1979, c. 288, s. 94, amended by Motor VehicleAmendtentAc4 1982, S.B.C. 1982,
c. 36, s. 19. The Act contemplated a minimum period of imprisonment for those who drove
without a valid driver's licence or who drove while their license was under suspension.
37 Supra, note 2 at 521.
38 R v. Oakes, supra, note 2 at 138-139.
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of legislation is a function, in part, of what it tries to accomplish.
For a court to weigh this on its scale is to question its wisdom.
Even if one takes the rather dubious position that the
wisdom of legislation is exclusively a function of the legislative means
chosen, and not of the ends pursued, the result is the same.
According to Oakes, the test to be applied with regard to the
legislative means is one of proportionality: "in each case courts will
be required to balance the interests of society with those of
individuals and groups."39 More specifically, there must be a rational
connection between means and ends, the legislation must not impose
upon constitutional rights to a greater extent than is necessary to
achieve the objective pursued, and one must balance the importance
of the governmental objective against the importance and degree of
violation of the constitutional right at issue.40
How can it be said that this does not involve the Court in
questioning the wisdom of legislation? When legislators consider
the enactment of a given law, they ask themselves whether the ends
to be realized by the law are justified by the costs entailed by the
legislation. Responsible legislators consider the impact on rights as
one such cost in their evaluation of the wisdom of their legislation;
the fact that legislation has been passed is evidence that the
legislators believed that the benefits outweighed the costs and that
the balance of interests struck in the legislation was justified. Is that
not what we mean when we talk of the wisdom of a law? And yet,
this is precisely what is entailed in the application of the
proportionality test under section 1.
Lest this be misunderstood, I am not suggesting that the
Court is aware that it is invoking a distinction that is impossible to
maintain. On the contrary, I have no doubt that the Court sincerely
believes that it can exercise judicial review under the Charter
without questioning the wisdom of legislation. Nevertheless, the
Court's good faith cannot transform an illusory distinction into a real
one.
What is real, of course, is the rhetorical function of invoking
the distinction. By drawing a line between permissible and
3 9 1bid. at 139.
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impermissible approaches to constitutional interpretation, the Court
reassures its audiences (and itself) that it is acting judicially and not
politically. As suggested earlier, it is the legitimacy of judicial review
itself that is ultimately at stake. Unless the role of the judge can be
distinguished from that of legislator, the power of the courts under
the Charter cannot easily be justified in a democratic society.
C. Limiting the Appearance of Balancing Interests
To the extent that a court appears to be deciding cases by
defining legal rights and applying legal rules, it acts consistently with
the traditional image of adjudication. In the eyes of much of the
legal community, this rather formalistic style needs no elaborate
defence - it is itself a legitimating ideal of adjudication. Where a
court appears to be engaged in a process of openly balancing
competing interests, however, the image of adjudication becomes
much more political and, amongst many, more controversial.41 The
purpose of this section is to show how the Court depoliticised its
early interpretations of the Charter by limiting the extent to which
it had to balance interests openly.
The most striking example is provided by the Court's opinion
in Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards v. A.G. Quebec
(No. 2). Having set out the conflicts between the provisions of
Quebec's Charter of the French Language42 ("Bill 101") and section
23 of the Charter, the Court held that it was unnecessary to consider
any of the arguments submitted by Quebec under section 1. The
Court reasoned that the drafters of the Charter clearly had Quebec's
legislation in mind when they drafted section 23, thereby intending
to limit the scope of Quebec's language legislation as it related to
the language of instruction in schools. Accordingly, the drafters
41 See Gold, supra, note 5.
42 IRS.Q. 1977, c. C-1l.
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could not have contemplated that section 1 could save the
legislation.43
For a Court determined to give a liberal interpretion to the
Charter while maintaining its image as a judicial and non-political
body, the avoidance of any analysis of section 1 in this case was a
brilliant stroke of rhetorical strategy. If one recalls the lengthy
reasons for judgment written by Chief Justice Desch~nes of the
Superior Court of Quebec in that case, one can appreciate why the
Supreme Court was eager to avoid a similar analysis. 44 Simply put,
to have entered into a section 1 analysis would have required the
Court to pass judgment on the conflicting evidence concerning
demographic trends in the province, and more to the point, on the
importance of promoting French in Quebec as compared with the
burden on minority language rights imposed by Bill 101. To observe
that these are matters of intense political importance in Quebec
understates the obvious: no other issue is as potentially explosive as
language. In my view, the Court did not want to be seen as
responsible for a decision adverse to the government of Quebec.45
Far better to have a judgment - and an anonymous one at that -
that allowed the Court to say as little as possible, and which placed
the responsibility for the decision squarely on the drafters of the
Charter and not on the Court.
There are other examples, albeit less highly charged, where
the Court limited the circumstances under which it will be forced, in
future, to balance interests openly. For example, in Re Singh and
Minister of Employment and Immigration, Madame Justice Wilson
held that the lack of an oral hearing for the adjudication of refugee
claims under the Immigration Act, 197646 violated section 7 of the
43Supra, note 2 at 79-84. The Court also reasoned that the impugned provisions of
Quebec's legislation, if upheld, would amount in effect to an amendment of section 23.
Amendments must be pursued through the amending formulae set out in the constitution and
cannot be effected via the terms of section 1 of the Charter. Ibid. at 86-88.
44 Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards v. A.G. Que. (No. 2) (1982), 140 D.L.R.
(3d) 33, 3 C.RR 114 (Que. Sup. Ct.).
45 On this issue, an analogy can be drawn between this case and the second patriation case
concerning Quebec's putative veto over constitutional change. See Gold, supra, note 5.
4 6 S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, ss. 2 and 71.
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Charter. The government argued, inter alia, that the procedures
were justified under section 1, given that the Immigration Appeal
Board had too many cases and too few resources to be able to
accord an oral hearing in each case. Rejecting this argument,
Madame Justice Wilson expressed her doubts that such "utilitarian
consideration[s]" could support the limitation of constitutional rights
under section 1.7  By dismissing arguments of this kind as
illegitimate, Madame Justice Wilson avoided having to weigh the
competing interests in the case.
The opinions of Madame Justice Wilson provide an example
of another way in which the need to balance interests overtly is
minimized. For example, in both Operation Dismantle and the
Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), Madame
Justice Wilson defined the concept of liberty as set out in section 7
in non-absolute terms, thus recognizing limits to liberty without
having to employ the rather political language of section 1.48 To be
sure, this general approach to the conception of rights and their
limits has a very respectable philosophical pedigree.4 9 Moreover, it
may be that the very same considerations enter into the analysis
regardless of whether one defines rights absolutely and limits them
through section 1, or defines the rights more narrowly without
reference to section 1. At the rhetorical level, however, there is a
difference between the two approaches: the process of defining
rights appears paradigmatically judicial, whereas balancing interests
appears more political.
Consider finally the conception of legislative purpose as
advanced by the Chief Justice in the Big M Drug Mart case. Having
affirmed that legislative purpose is constitutionally relevant, the Chief
Justice rejected the idea that the purpose might change over time.5 0
4 7 Singh, supra, note 2 at 218-219.
4 8 Operation Dismantle, supra, note 2 at 488; Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle
Act (B.C.), supra, note 2 at 529.
49 See, for example, Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-
Hall, 1973).
50 "Purpose is a function of the intent of those who drafted and enacted the legislation at
the time, and not of any shifting variable." Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 2 at 335.
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To the extent that legislation can be struck down on the basis of an
original legislative purpose found to contravene the Charter, as was
the case in Big M Drug Mart itself, this tends to limit the need to
balance interests overtly. Moreover, the reasons given for rejecting
the notion of a shifting legislative purpose illuminate the Court's
rhetorical design:
No legislation would be safe from a revised judicial assessment of purpose. Laws
assumed valid on the basis of persuasive and powerful authority could, at any time,
be struck down as invalid. Not only would this create uncertainty in the law, but it
would encourage re-litigation of the same issues and, it could be argued, provide the
courts with a means by which to arrive at a result dictated by other than legal
considerations.gy
By invoking the dangers of uncertainty and instability, the Chief
Justice addresses the deep concerns of his audiences, notably the
legal community.52 Indeed, by raising the spectre of decisions
"dictated by other than legal considerations," he suggests the
distinction between permissible and impermissible approaches to
constitutional interpretation - between judging the wisdom of
legislation as opposed to its constitutionality. Although it is unclear
why the "shifting purpose" approach raises this danger more in this
than in any other case, the reference to the danger reassures the
reader that the decision reached by the Court was based upon
proper considerations.
D. Invoking and Rejecting the Intent of the Drafters
The final matter to be considered here is the role played by
the concept of the drafters' intentions. In the great majority of
cases considered here, the Court appealed to an assumed drafters'
intention to justify the interpretations given to the Charter. For
example, in 4.G. Quebec v. Quebec Association of Protestant School
Boards the Court relied upon the drafters' intent to justify the
51 Supra, note 2 at 334-335.
52 This passage gestures towards a set of values associated with the ideal of the Rule of
Law. See, for example, J. Raz, 'The Rule of Law and its Virtue" (1977) 93 L.Q. Rev. 195. The
Rule of Law remains an ideal around which the legal community is organized and will rally.
See generally A. Hutchinson and P. Monahan, eds., The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology?
(Toronto: Carswell, 1987).
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avoidance of a section 1 analysis.53 In other cases the Court invoked
what might be termed a negative intention of the drafters in support
of its Charter interpretation. For example, in R. v. Therens, Mr
Justice Le Dain justified his definition of the term "detention" in
section 10 by observing that it was unreasonable to assume that the
drafters intended that the term be defined in the same way as it
had been by the courts under the Bill of Rights 4  Similarly, in
Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.c.), Mr. Justice
Lamer invoked the intention of the drafters to reject an
interpretation of section 7 that would have equated it with the
principles of natural justice as understood in administrative law.
It is, in my view, that precise and somewhat narrow meaning that the legislator
avoided, clearly indicating thereby a will to give greater content to the words
"principles of fundamental justice", the limits of which were left for the courts to
develop....
5
In light of all of these allusions, it is easy to conclude that
the drafters' intentions were to govern the Court's interpretations of
the Charter. Nothing, however, is quite so simple. Every time that
the drafters' actual intentions were established through evidence, the
Court refused to consider them.56 The clearest example of this is
also the most telling.
In Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.),
counsel for British Columbia provided evidence of the testimony of
the Minister of Justice, the Deputy Minister, and the Assistant
Deputy Minister, Public Law, before the Special Joint Committee on
the Constitution, to the effect that section 7 was intended to refer
to procedure only. Notwithstanding his reliance on the assumed
intent of the drafters when rejecting the argument that would define
section 7 in terms of natural justice, Mr. Justice Lamer ignored the
Supra, note 2 at 82, 84, 87-88.
5 4 Supra, note 2 at 639-640. He applied the same form of reasoning in interpreting section
24 of the Charter, holding that it was not intended that evidence could be excluded pursuant
to section 24(1). Ibid. at 647-648.
5 5 Supra, note 2 at 504.
56 In Skapinker, supra, note 2 at 382, Mr. Justice Estey stated that it was unnecessary to
consider the legislative history of section 6. See also R. v. Therens, supra, note 2 at 647.
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submitted testimony by giving it virtually no probative value
whatsoever."' As a result, section 7 was defined in terms much
broader than appears to have been intended by those who drafted
the clause, thereby increasing the range of circumstances in which it
could be used to strike down legislation.
The rhetorical perspective provides the key to what would
otherwise appear as a logical contradiction, for there is indeed a
rhetorical logic to the way that the Court treats the question of the
drafters' intent. The rejection of the evidence of the Minister and
his colleagues was a response to the expectation that the Charter be
interpreted liberally by the Court. After all, in a judicial world-view
dominated by the image of the living tree, there is little allure in the
idea of tying constitutional interpretation to the original intent of the
drafters. At the same time, rhetorical considerations explain why the
reasons for judgment so regularly invoke the drafters' intentions to
justify the interpretations given. This is not only a convention of
style, but is rooted in our positivist legal culture 58 By appealing to
the intentions of others, the Court distances itself from responsibility
for the interpretations actually given, thereby invoking a traditional
and non-political image of itself - the Court is not making
interpretive choices at all, but merely deferring to the will of others.
At the level of rhetoric, who can say that the Court lacks finesse?
IV. THE RHETORIC OF ACTIVISM
The preceding part suggested that the Court invoked the
traditional image of itself as an adjudicative institution in order to
legitimate its expanded role under the Charter. The Court had to
5 7 Supra, note 2 at 507-509. There are a number of compelling reasons for rejecting the
intent of the drafters as a decisive, or even weighty, element in constitutional interpretation.
These are well known and need not be rehearsed here. See P. Brest, "The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding" (1980) 60 Bos. U.L Rev. 204 and R. Dworkin, A Matter of
Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) at 33-71.
58 The core idea is that the Charter is valid, and hence to be applied, only because of the
process through which it came to be enacted, and not because of any transcendant
correspondence between it and natural law. See H.LA. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1961). It would appear to be a short step from this positivist foundation to
the proposition that a court ought to be following the views of those who brought the Charter
into being.
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do more, however, than merely convince its audiences of the
legitimacy of judicial review in general. First, it had to persuade its
audiences that its decisions in particular cases were correct and
appropriate; second, it had to satisfy the pervasive expectation that
the Charter would be an instrument used for the vigorous protection
of individual rights. Beginning with the latter, the following sections
consider some of the ways in which the Court pursued these
objectives.
A. The Rhetoric of Individualism
Given both the expectations surrounding the Charter and the
need to provide guidance to its audiences, the Court quickly set out
to establish its preferred approach to Charter interpretation.
Advancing the general principle that the Charter must be interpreted
"purposively," both with respect to the nature of the interests
underlying a particular section of the Charter and to the "character
and the larger objects of the Charter itself,"59 the Court made it
clear that the Charter would not suffer the same fate as had the Bill
of Rights.
Two complementary conceptions of the Charter underlie the
Court's opinions in these early cases. The first is the image of the
Charter as a living tree, and the second is the idea that the Charter
was designed for "the unremitting protection of individual rights and
liberties."60 These two conceptions function rhetorically to support
those readings of the Charter that favour and expand the protection
of rights over those which would limit the scope of the rights
protected. For example, in Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor
Vehicle Act (B.C.), Mr. Justice Lamer invoked the living tree
metaphor to deny probative value to the statements of the
59 Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 2 at 344.
60 Hunter v. Southana, supra, note 2 at 155.
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government officials concerning the meaning of section 7,61 and he
reinforced his preferred interpretation with the argument that a
broader reading of section 7 is to be preferred over a narrower
one.62 Similar considerations informed the opinion of Mr. Justice Le
Dain in Therens where he rejected the definition of "detention"
advanced by the Court under the Bill of Rights as inappropriately
narrow for the Charter.63 Indeed, even when Mr. Justice Beetz
resuscitated the Bill of Rights in the Singh case, he justified it by
observing that it would serve the "better protection of rights and
freedoms."64 The Court clearly has based its jurisprudence on the
proposition that the interpretation that best promotes rights is the
one to be preferred.65
Informing this jurisprudence is a highly individualistic, almost
classical liberal vision of the Charter and of Canadian society. By
classical liberalism I refer to a tradition of social thought that is
constituted by a number of related ideas: the primacy of the
individual over community and the State, the mistrust of if not
hostility toward a broad role for government, and a general faith in
judges and the Rule of Law as protection against the collectivist
pretensions of modern democratic government.6 All of these ideas
can be found prominently in the cases.
The dominant tone in the judgments is highly individualistic.
For example, in Hunter v. Southam, notwithstanding that it was a
61 "If the newly planted 'living tree' which is the Charter is to have the possibility of
growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to ensure that historical materials, such
as the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee, do not stunt its
growth." Supra, note 2 at 509.
62 Ibid. at 500-502.
63 Supra at note 2 at 638-40.
64 Supra at note 2 at 224.
65 See, for example, Big MDrug Mart, supra, note 2 at 331, where Chief Justice Dickson
defends the independent relevance of legislative purpose in Charter adjudication, by arguing
that rights will be better protected in this way.
6 6 See, for example, F. A. von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1960) and Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (London: Routledge & K. Paul,
1973; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976; and Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1979).
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corporation which invoked the protection against unreasonable
search or seizure as guaranteed by section 8 of the Charter, the
reasons for judgment are dominated by references to individual rights
to privacy and so on.67 Similarly, in the Big M Drug Mart case, the
Chief Justice wrote at length about respect for human dignity and
the valuation of individual conscience, notwithstanding that it was a
corporation that brought the action challenging the Lord's Day Act.
Through the constant affirmation of the virtues and values of
individual rights, the Court not only adds to the persuasive force of
its opinions, it also encourages us to see ourselves as rights-holders,
thereby transforming the language of political discourse in Canada. 68
Consistent with the classical liberal tradition, the Court
defines individual rights in opposition to the interests and claims of
government. For example, freedom is defined as the absence of
coercion or constraint, but it is government, typically, that is
presented as the enemy of freedom.69 Even the Court's conception
of democracy is tied to notions of individual rights. As the Chief
Justice wrote:
It should also be noted, however, that an emphasis on individual conscience and
individual judgment also lies at the heart of our democratic political tradition. The
ability of each citizen to make free and informed decisions is the absolute
prerequisite r the legitimacy, acceptability, and efficacy of our system of self-
government.
More generally, the opinions can be read as evidencing a
general antipathy towards government. For example, to limit rights
under section 1 the government must satisfy the very stringent test
as set out in the Oakes case, including the requirement that the
governmental objective relate to "concerns which are pressing and
67 For a critique of the individualistic tenor of the case, see A. Petter, 'The Politics of the
Charter" (1986) 8 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 473.
68 See J. White, When Words Lose Their Meaning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1984) 218.
69 See, for example, the opinion of Madame Justice Wilson in Operation Dismantle, supra,
note 2 at 488. See also Mr. Justice Dickson's opinion in Hunter v. Southan, supra, note 2 at
156: the Charter "is intended to constrain governmental action inconsistent with those rights
and freedoms."
70 Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 2 at 346.
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substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be
characterized as sufficiently important. 71 Moreover, the Court offers
a fairly individualistic interpretation in setting out the values and
principles essential to a free and democratic society, the values said
to govern the evaluation of government's submissions under
section 1:
...respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice
and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and
group identity, and faith in social and political, institutions which enhance the
participation of individuals and groups in society.
72
Finally, the nature of the governmental interests at stake in the
cases are rarely elaborated with the same precision or detail as are
the individual interests affected. The best example may be found in
Hunter v. Southam, where the Court characterized the government's
interest in the Combines Investigation Act as "simply law
enforcement. 73  In all of this we can see the suspicious attitude
towards government that lies at the heart of classical liberal thought.
The individualistic thrust of the Court's rhetoric is reinforced
by what appears to be a deontological conception of individual rights
that appears in some of the cases.74 For example, as noted earlier,
Madame Justice Wilson appears to reject the idea that arguments of
efficiency or administrative convenience can be invoked legitimately
in order to limit rights set out in the Charter,75 and in Big M Drug
71 Supra, note 2 at 138-39.
72 Oakes, supra, note 2 at 136.
73 Supra, note 2 at 168. See Petter, supra, note 67.
74 Within the liberal tradition one can distinguish between deontological and utilitarian
conceptions of rights. A deontological conception admits that rights may be limited in the
interest of securing the rights of others, but denies that it is appropriate to limit individual
rights in the name of general societal welfare. John Rawls is the best known contemporary
exponent of a deontological theory of rights. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971). A sophisticated form of utilitarianism is
advanced in R.M. Hare, Freedom andReason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). In the context
of constitutional interpretation, the conception of rights chosen will determine what kinds of
arguments are deemed legitimate and which are to be rejected as inadmissible. See M. Gold,
"Equality before the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada: A Case Study" (1980) 18 Osgoode
Hall LJ. 336 at 364-366.
75 Siugh, supra, note 2 at 218-219.
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Mart, Chief Justice Dickson dismissed one of the government's
submissions under section 1 as "no more than an argument of
convenience and expediency."76 Even when it is acknowledged that
arguments of administrative convenience can possibly justify the
limitation of rights, the circumstances are narrowly conceived. As
Mr. Justice Lamer put it, such arguments could justify absolute
liability offences (in the face of section 7 of the Charter) "only in
cases arising out of exceptional conditions, such as natural disasters,
the outbreak of war, epidemics, and the like."77
Finally, consistent with the liberal faith in courts and mistrust
of other governmental institutions, the decisions affirm the priority
of the judicial world-view. In Hunter v. Southam the Court insisted
on a quasi-judicial regime for the authorization of searches under the
Combines Investigation Act,78 notwithstanding rather compelling
arguments that this would impair the effectiveness of the legislation
as enforced. Similarly, in the Singh case, the Court required that
there be an open hearing for the redetermination of refugee claims,
notwithstanding the burden that this imposed on the entire system.
Are these not examples of the traditional antipathy of judges to
administrative processes, informed by a sense that the judicial way
is the best way?79
The Court's individualistic rhetoric is easily explained. The
idea of a constitutional Bill of Rights limiting government is
paradigmatically a liberal one, reflecting a vision of society in which
the individual is central. Moreover, it is fair to say that most judges,
by virtue of their professional training and experience, are rather
comfortable with a liberal conception of the world and would find
the basic premises of classical liberalism to be almost self-evident.
Finally, generations of legal scholars have been pleading with the
76 Supra, note 2 at 352.
77 Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), supra, note 2 at 518.
78 RIS.C. 1970, c. C-23.
79 See H. Arthurs, "Rethinking Administrative Law-. A Slightly Dicey Business'(1979) 17
Osgoode Hall LJ. 1. It is not surprising that the Court appears to favour judicial models to
administrative ones. The Charter itself is a testament to the faith we have that judges can and
will decide issues of rights not only in a fair way, but in a way that is superior to legislative or
administrative bodies.
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Court to take individual rights more seriously, and once the Court
decided to apply the Charter generously, it had to communicate that
message strongly and unequivocally to its various audiences.
Whatever one's views on such matters, it should be acknowledged
that the Court is doing essentially what we asked and apparently
desired it to do.
Given the popular and professional understanding of the
Charter as designed to protect individuals from the excesses of
government, the Court's individualistic rhetoric performed a
legitimating function for its activism in these early cases. The Court
also deployed other rhetorical techniques in combination with the
rhetoric of individualism to enhance the persuasiveness of its
opinions in particular cases. These techniques are the subject of the
following sections.
B. The Rhetoric of Facts
It is a commonplace among experienced counsel that the
manner in which one presents the facts of the case can be crucial
to the success of one's cause. Experienced judges are no less
sensitive to the rhetorical dimension of how the facts are presented,
as is illustrated by the reasons for judgment in Hunter v. Southam.
The offices of the Edmonton Journal were the object of a
search authorized under section 10 of the Combines Investigation
Act.80 Of the authorization for the search, Mr. Justice Dickson (as
he then was) wrote:
The authorization has a breath-taking sweep; it is tantamount to a licence to roam
at large on the premises of Southam Inc. at the stated address "and elsewhere in
Canada"....
[rhe officials] declined to give the name of any person whose complaint had initiated
the inquiry, or to say under which section of the Act the inquiry had been begun.
They also declined to give more specific information as to He subject matter of the
inquiry than that contained in the authorization to search.10
81 Hunter v. Southam, supra, note 2 at 150.
80 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23. The Court held that the provisions authorizing the search violated
the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure as guaranteed by section 8 of the
Charter.
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What do these passages mean? They cannot mean that it
was the scope of the authorization or the behaviour of the officials
that rendered the law unconstitutional, for Mr. Justice Dickson
insisted otherwise:
At the outset it is important to note that the issue in this appeal concerns the
constitutional validity of a statute authorizing a search and seizure. It does not
concern the reasonableness or otherwise of the manner in which the appellants
carried out their statutory authority. It is not the conduct of the appellants, bg~
rather the legislation under which they acted, to which attention must be directed6
The rhetorical perspective provides the key to the meaning of these
passages. The exposition of the facts suggests the dangers associated
with administrative regimes and implies that a judicial process would
not have produced such a sweeping authorization. Moreover, the
description of the actions of the officials invites the reader to view
the entire process in a bad light. Why did the officials fail to
divulge the name of the complainant? Why did they fail to specify
the section of the Act, or to provide "more specific information as
to the subject-matter of the inquiry than that contained in the
authorization"? Let us leave aside any questions about their
obligation to provide such information, for in the absence of any
such obligation, they were only doing their job, however
ungraciously. The rhetorical object was to describe the
administrative process in as negative terms as possible, in order to
persuade us that the Court was right to strike it down.
Another example is provided by Big M Drug Mart where the
Court struck down those provisions of the Lord's Day Acts3 that
prohibited commercial activity on Sunday. As in Hunter v. Southam,
the particular facts of the case were irrelevant; it was the law itself
that was impugned. Nevertheless, early in his opinion Chief Justice
Dickson wrote that the police who were in the store on Sunday
"witnessed several transactions including the sale of groceries, plastic
cups and a bicycle lock." 4 Except to confirm the fact that the store
was open on Sunday, these facts are beside the point. From the
82 Ibid. at 154.
83 R1S.C. 1970, c. L-13.
8 4 Supra, note 2 at 301.
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rhetorical perspective, however, the recitation of these facts suggest
the banality of the law as it is applied. Imagine, for a moment, that
the transactions did not involve the sale of some plastic cups, but
rather the sale of pornographic magazines, or of some other material
deemed offensive. Would the Court have been so quick to specify
the nature of the transactions in such a case?85
C. The Rhetoric of Characterization
Students of constitutional law quickly appreciate that the
way in which a judge characterizes legislation under review can
determine whether it will be upheld or struck down.86 To illustrate
the rhetorical dimension of the characterization of legislation,
consider the opinion of Chief Justice Dickson in the Big M Drug
Mart case.
At the beginning of his opinion the Chief Justice presents
the Lord's Day Act in fairly neutral terms, as legislation prohibiting
commercial activity on SundaysY' The tone begins to shift as a
subsequent passage speaks of the "acknowledged purpose of the
Lord's Day Act [as] the compulsion of sabbatical observance."88 As
the reasons develop, the characterizations become increasingly harsh,
so that by the end of the opinion, the Act has been characterized
in terms so exceptionally negative that one has no doubt that it must
offend the Charter:
To the extent that it binds all to a sectarian Christian ideal, the Lord's Day Act works
a form of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charter and the dignity of all non-
85 The case also provides an example of another technique analogous to the rhetoric of
facts. Speaking of the Lord's Day Act, the Chief Justice wrote: "It is important to note that
any person may be exempted from the operation of ss. 4, 6, and 7 by provincial legislation or
municipal charter." Supra, note 2 at 302. Why was it important to note these exemptions? In
terms of the strict holding of the case, it would appear irrelevant. But from the point of view
of rhetoric, it encourages the reader to wonder if the social purpose underlying the law can be
so important given the possibility of so many exemptions from the law. Accordingly, how much
of value really is being lost when the Court strikes down the law?
86 P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed., (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 313-314.
87 Big M Drug Mart, supra, note 2 at 301.
88 1bid. at 333.
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Christians. In proclaiming the standards of the Christian faith, the Act creates a
climate hostile to, and gives the appearance of discrimination against, non-Christian
Canadians. It takes religious values rooted in Christian morality and, using the force
of the state, translates them into a positive law binding on believers and non-believers
alike...The arm of the State requires all to remember the Lord's day of the Christians
and to keep it holy. The protection of one religion and the concomitant non-
protection of othg~s imports disparate impact destructive of the religious freedom of
the collectivity...
and
... IThe true purpose of the Lord's Day Act is to compel the observance of the
Christian Sabbath.... 0
These characterizations are reinforced by the terms used to
describe the Act. For example, count the number of times the terms
coercion, compulsion, and constraint appear in the opinion. These
terms have a negative connotation in our language, so much so that
they have been dubbed "vice words" by Professor Westen91  Given
that the Court adopted a definition of freedom as the absence of
coercion or constraint, every invocation of such a negative term as
"coercion" tends to suggest that its opposite concept, freedom, is
being infringed. This tends to enhance the persuasiveness of the
result.
Given all of this, the conclusion that the Lord's Day Act
offends the freedom of religion guaranteed by section 2 of the
Charter seems unimpeachable. At the same time, one might
question the accuracy of the Chief Justice's latter descriptions of the
Act - that it requires one to keep the Christian Sabbath holy, and
so on. In fact, nothing in the law requires one to keep Sunday holy
or otherwise to compel the observance of the Sabbath.
Nevertheless, from the rhetorical point of view, however accurate or
overstated one might judge these characterizations of the Act to be,
the way in which they are structured is most effective.
89 Ibid. at 337.
90 Ibid. at 351.
91 P. Westen, "'Freedom' and 'Coercion' - Virtue Words and Vice Words" [1985]
Duke L. 541.
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D. The Rhetoric of Denigration
A successful judicial opinion persuades its readers that the
arguments accepted by the court were superior to those rejected.
Typically this is achieved by arguments directed specifically to the
merits of the opposing positions, but judges sometimes pursue the
task of persuasion in less direct if not unconscious ways. This
section considers two techniques by means of which the force of the
rejected arguments can be blunted: the manner in which the issue
is posed, and the manner in which the losing party is portrayed.
Experienced trial counsel appreciate that the way one asks
a question can have a significant influence on the answer provided. 92
Judges know this too, as is evidenced by Madame Justice Wilson's
opinion concerning section 1 of the Charter in Singh.
To justify the lack of a hearing before the Immigration
Appeal Board as a reasonable limit to the rights guaranteed by
section 7, the government argued that the Canadian procedures had
been approved of by the office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, that it was common in western countries
to deal with such matters administratively without hearings, and that
the volume of cases before the Immigration Appeal Board was so
large that it was impossible to accord a hearing in each case. In
response, Madame Justice Wilson characterized the question raised
by section 1 in the following terms:
The issue in the present case is not simply whether the procedures set out in the
Immigration Act 1976 for the adjudication of refugee claims are reasonable; it is
whether it is reasonable to deprive the appellants of the right to life, liberty and
security of the person by adopting a system for the adjudication of reface status
claims which does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice. 
At the semantic and doctrinal level, there does not appear
to be any difference between the two ways of posing the question.
Whether or not the procedure is reasonable is a function not only
92 This underlies the general rule limiting the leading of witnesses in direct examination.
See SA Schiff, Evidence in the Litigation Process, 2d ed., vol. 1 (Toronto: Carswell, 1983) at
178-186.
9 3 Supra, note 2 at 218.
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of the financial costs associated with holding hearings, but of the
consequences to the individuals affected by the process. After all,
the nature of the individual interests at stake is one of the relevant
factors courts consider when determining the content of "natural
justice" applicable in the circumstances.9 4 If this is so, it would seem
that both of the ways in which the question was posed by Madame
Justice Wilson oblige us to consider the very same factors.
At the rhetorical level, however, there is a considerable
difference between the two formulations. The first directs our
attention towards the law and the governmental interests underlying
it, while the second focusses our attention on the individuals who
have been denied their rights. Moreover, the way Madame Justice
Wilson states the issue implies that the decision to establish the
impugned procedure was taken in full knowledge that it was contrary
to the principles of fundamental justice, when it is just as plausible
to assume that the drafters honestly believed that it was both
reasonable and just to proceed administratively. By posing the
question as she did, Madame Justice Wilson directs our attention to
those features of the issue that support her ultimate conclusions.
Another technique of reinforcing one's own position is to
denigrate the character or competence of those who advanced the
opposing arguments. Consider the way that Chief Justice Dickson
introduced the appellant's (ultimately unsuccessful) arguments in the
Operation Dismantle case:
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the exact nature of the deprivation
of life and security of the person that the appell ts rely upon as the legal foundation
for the violation of s.7 they allege is not clear.D
"
Later in the opinion he writes:
I believe that we are obliged to read the statement of claim as generously as possible
and to accommodate any inadequais in the form of the allegations which are merely
the result of drafting deficiencies.
94 See, for example, J.M. Evans, ed., de Smith's JudicialReview ofAdministrativeAction, 4th
ed., (London: Stevens, 1980) at 156-240.
95 Supra, note 2 at 450.
96Ibid. at 451.
1987]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
The contrast between the implicit image of the appellants
and that of the Court is striking. The appellants failed to argue
their position clearly; the Court must make a considerable effort to
understand their argument. Moreover, there was certainly a lack of
clarity, if not error, in their pleadings. Can it not be said that this
suggests a lack of professionalism on their part? In contrast, the
Court presents itself as generous and accommodating, ready to go to
whatever lengths necessary to understand the appellant's arguments.
In this way we are encouraged to view those arguments as weak, and
those of the Court as well founded." Moreover, by putting the
responsibility for losing on the appellant's counsel, the Court invokes
the classical image of adjudication, thereby legitimating the decision
and reinforcing its persuasiveness.
V. CONCLUSION
It remains only to conclude with three brief observations on
the analysis presented here. The first concerns the benefits of
taking a rhetorical perspective on the judicial opinion. It is not only
that we gain insights into our legal culture by attending to the
argumentative practices that make up that culture: a rhetorical
analysis also can provide a perspective through which we can
understand what would otherwise appear paradoxical or
contradictory. For example, it has been said of the Skapinker
decision that it "displays a curious disharmony in reasoning and
approach" in that it combines broad statements of principle with an
approach that is very text-bound.98 From the rhetorical perspective,
however, there is nothing at all curious about the blend of these two
styles. The expansive rhetoric on the nature of constitutional
interpretation that begins the opinion was a response to the
97 A similar denigration of the opposing viewpoint can be seen in Mr. Justice Lamer's
opinion in Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor VehicleAct (B.C.), supra, note 2 at 498, where
those who would interpret section 7 procedurally are depicted as viewing the issue in a "narrow
and restrictive fashion," while those (including the Court) who take a broader view of section
7 are adopting "an open-minded approach."
98 H. Scott Fairley, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1983-84 Term" (1985) 7
Sup. Ct. L Rev. 63 at 120.
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audience's expectations that the Charter would be interpreted
liberally, as well as a signal to bench, bar, and government that the
Court was taking the Charter seriously. At the same time, given
that the Court did not uphold the Charter argument in Skapinker,
its text-bound rhetoric can be understood as a response to the
expectation that decisions should be rendered in a judicial and non-
political manner.
The second observation concerns the role of the Court as
revealed in the cases analysed. As suggested earlier, the Court's
activism can be understood in terms of the rhetorical situation facing
the Court: it had to communicate its view of the Charter
unequivocally and unambiguously to its various audiences. It will be
appreciated, however, that cases subsequent to those analysed here
reveal the Court to have moderated its position somewhat. The
Court's cautious interpretations of the language rights guarantees,
99
the upholding of Ontario's Sunday closing legislation,10 and the
Court's generally conservative interpretation of the remedial and
jurisdictional scope of the Charter'01 suggest a Court searching for
a more balanced approach to its role than its activism in the early
cases would have suggested. It may be that future analyses of the
Court and the Charter will bracket these initial cases as but the first
of many phases through which the Court will have passed.
This leads me to my final point, and it relates to the
direction that future work of this kind should take. If the general
thrust of this paper has been descriptive and explanatory, it is not
to suggest that this exhausts the ways in which rhetorical analysis can
or should be practiced. On the contrary, critical evaluation of the
political visions expressed in the cases is of central importance to a
comprehensive treatment of the Court's rhetoric. It bears repeating,
however, that any such analysis should be based upon a
9 9 Bilodeau v. A.G. Manitoba (1986), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 449, 27 D.LR. (4th) 39; MacDonald
v. City of Montreal (1986), [1986] 1 S.C.. 460, 27 D.LR (4th) 321; Societe des Acadiens du
Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Association ofParentsforFaimess in Education (1986), [1986] 1 S.C.tL
549, 27 D.LR. (4th) 406.
100 Edwards Books and Art Ltd. v. R, (1986), [1986] 2 S.C.tR 713, 71 N.R- 161.
101 On the scope of the Charter, see Retai; fholesale and Department Store Union, Local
580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. (1986), [1986] 2 S.C.RI 573, 71 N.R. 83. On the question of
remedial jurisdiction under the Charter, see Mills v. R. (1986), [1986] 1 S.C.R- 863, 67 N.R. 241.
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representative sample of cases if it is not to be misleading and
ultimately irrelevant. Moreover, the issues raised are complex and
difficult, and any responsible treatment of them necessarily must be
a lengthy one if it is to avoid facile labels and undefended premises.
In this respect, it would be relatively easy to mount a critique
against the societal vision expressed in the initial cases, inasmuch as
it appears vulnerable to all of the criticisms made against classical
liberal theory.102 To the extent that the Court tempers its
individualistic liberalism with a recognition of the claims of
government and community, however, a rhetorical analysis of the
jurisprudence will engage a richer and more defensible version of the
liberal vision 03 Important as these matters are, my consideration
of them must await another occasion.
102 One would argue that the individualistic focus in the cases obscures the extent to which
we as individuals are constituted socially, that the liberal vision renders other more communal
forms of human association less legitimate and less realizable, and so on. See, for example, M.
Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
In my earlier analysis of these cases I was tempted by such a critique. See M. Gold, "La
Rhetorique des droits constitutionnels" (1988) 22 Themis 1. I am now of the view that such
a critique was premature.
103 See, for example, J. Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical" (1985) 14
Philosophy & Public Affairs 223. On certain problems with the communitarian perspective, see
A. Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism" (1985) 14 Philosophy & Public Affairs 308.
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